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THE NEW ADDITIONAL CONVEYANCE DUTIES REGIME 
IN THE STAMP DUTIES ACT 
The new additional conveyance duties regime has gone 
beyond attempting to achieve tax neutrality between direct 
transfers of residential property and indirect transfers 
through the use of property-holding entities. It taxes an 
entirely new tax base and raises issues such as: the extremely 
broad concept of an “associate” relationship; definition of 
“unit in a property trust”; anti-avoidance provisions; liability 
for providing false information; tax neutrality; and the 
considerable flexibility that the section 23 Order provides the 
Government. This article analyses the regime in detail and 
considers the implications of various changes to the 
prescribed values in the section 23 Order. 
Vincent OOI* 
BA (Oxon); 
Research Assistant, EW Barker Centre for Law & Business, National 
University of Singapore. 
I. Introduction 
1 The Stamp Duties (Amendment) Bill1 (“the Bill”) was passed on 
10 March 2017 as an urgent bill. The Bill introduced a new additional 
conveyance duties (“ACD”) regime, designed to levy stamp duties on 
transfers of interests in property-holding entities (“PHEs”) and equalise 
the treatment between direct transfers of real property and indirect 
transfers through the use of PHEs. While the ACD regime was 
introduced partly in response to tax-avoidance measures, its effect is not 
so confined. The ACD regime levies a tax on an entirely new tax base, 
catching numerous situations that would not have fallen within the 
pre-amendment stamp duties regime.2 
                                                          
* I am grateful to Liu Hern Kuan, Stephen Phua and Leung Yew Kwong for their 
insightful comments. 
1 Bill 18 of 2017. 
2 As the provisions of the pre-amendment stamp duties regime are still in force 
alongside the new ACD regime, this article will call them the “direct stamp duties 
regime”. 
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2 This article seeks to explain the highly complex mechanism of 
the ACD regime, first by considering the context in which the Bill was 
passed3 and laying out the key concepts.4 This will provide the necessary 
clarity to proceed on to the next part of the article, which will go 
through the various components of the ACD regime in detail,5 including 
the supporting provisions like anti-avoidance measures and liability for 
providing false information.6 The article will then comment on various 
parts of the framework that may be of particular interest to the reader.7 
In particular, the extremely broad concept of an “associate”, the 
definition of “unit in a property trust”, and tax neutrality will be 
considered. The article will then address the potential implications of 
changes to the section 23 Order,8 a piece of subsidiary legislation that 
provides considerable flexibility to the ACD regime.9 
A. Stamp duties and residential property 
3 Stamp duty is a tax on particular instruments that are specified 
in the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act10 (“SDA”).11 It is a tax 
levied on instruments and not transactions; thus, transactions that can 
be conducted without writing will not be subject to stamp duties.12 In 
the context of residential property transactions, the transfer of 
proprietary interests must be in writing if the agreement is to be 
enforceable by the parties.13 The relevant stamp duties in residential 
property transactions include: (a) buyer’s stamp duty (“BSD”);14 
(b) additional buyer’s stamp duty (“ABSD”);15 and (c) seller’s stamp duty 
(“SSD”).16 
                                                          
3 See paras 3–8 below. 
4 See paras 9–27 below. 
5 See paras 28–44 below. 
6 See paras 45–54 below. 
7 See paras 55–82 below. 
8 Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
9 See paras 83–91 below. 
10 Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed. 
11 Leung Yew Kwong & Tan Kay Kheng, LexisNexis Annotated Statutes of Singapore: 
Stamp Duties Act 2015 (LexisNexis, 2015) at pp 19–20. 
12 Leung Yew Kwong & Tan Kay Kheng, LexisNexis Annotated Statutes of Singapore: 
Stamp Duties Act 2015 (LexisNexis, 2015) at pp 20–21. 
13 Leung Yew Kwong & Tan Kay Kheng, LexisNexis Annotated Statutes of Singapore: 
Stamp Duties Act 2015 (LexisNexis, 2015) at p 21; see also s 6(d) of the Civil Law 
Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed). 
14 See Art 3(a)(ii) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed). 
15 See Art 3(bf) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
16 See Art 3(bg)(b) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed). 
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4 There have been numerous tax-planning attempts to reduce the 
amount of stamp duties payable in residential property transactions. In 
UOL Development (Novena) Pte Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties17 
(“UOL Development”) the taxpayer attempted to argue that the en bloc 
sale of 53 properties involved 53 separate contracts. This would have 
resulted in savings in stamp duties if successful.18 In Lai Ling Wan v 
Commissioner of Stamp Duties19 (“Lai Lily”), the taxpayer attempted a 
similar approach to that in UOL Development in the en bloc purchase of 
83 strata units. In both cases, the Commissioner of Stamp Duties (“the 
Commissioner”) applied s 33A of the SDA, a general anti-avoidance rule 
that empowered the Commissioner to counteract any reduction of duty 
payable where the purpose of an arrangement had the reduction of duty 
as one of its main purposes. The High Court came to two different 
conclusions, holding the taxpayer’s arrangement in UOL Development 
had no sound commercial basis but finding bona fide commercial 
reasons for the arrangement in Lai Lily. 
5 When the taxpayers in UOL Development and Lai Lily were 
attempting their schemes, there was no ABSD or SSD. When these new 
duties were introduced, there were considerable incentives for taxpayers 
to attempt to circumvent the payment of stamp duties. While the 
maximum rate of BSD was 3%, ABSD could reach a maximum of 15% 
and SSD could reach 16%. Naturally, new tax-planning schemes evolved. 
One widely discussed tax-planning arrangement involved the transfer of 
the shares of a property-holding company rather than the property 
itself. While the transfer of a property could potentially attract BSD, 
ABSD and SSD, the transfer of the shares in a property-holding 
company would only attract stamp duties on share transfers, payable at 
the rate of 0.2%.20 
6 Stamp duties are not only used for revenue collection in 
Singapore but also as a tool for socio-economic policy,21 in particular to 
curb speculation in residential properties. If properties could be 
transferred indirectly through property-holding companies, the 
effectiveness of stamp duties in regulating the residential property 
                                                          
17 [2008] 1 SLR(R) 126. 
18 Under Art 3(a)(ii) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed), the first $180,000 of the value of the property is taxed at 1%, the next 
$180,000 at 2% and the rest at 3%. By splitting the en bloc transaction into 
53 separate contracts, the taxpayer hoped to be able to take advantage of the lower 
1% and 2% rates 53 times rather than just once. 
19 [2011] 4 SLR 845. 
20 See Art 3(c)(ii) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed). 
21 Leung Yew Kwong & Tan Kay Kheng, LexisNexis Annotated Statutes of Singapore: 
Stamp Duties Act 2015 (LexisNexis, 2015) at pp 11–15. 
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market would be seriously compromised. In January 2013, The Business 
Times published an article noting that estate agents were promoting the 
use of property special purpose vehicle as a means to circumvent 
ABSD.22 The Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore promptly 
responded to the article, making it clear that it intended to use the s 33A 
SDA general anti-avoidance rule to counteract such schemes.23 It was in 
this context that the Bill was drafted. 
B. Purpose of the Bill 
7 The Explanatory Statement to the Bill states that its purpose is 
“primarily to introduce new ad valorem duties for conveyances of equity 
interests in property-holding entities (PHE) that are computed on the 
basis of their underlying immovable properties”.24 While the Bill may 
have been inspired by the desire to counteract the tax-planning 
measures referred to above, the Explanatory Statement makes it clear 
that the ACD regime is not so confined. In light of the Inland  
Revenue Authority of Singapore’s recent successes in applying general 
anti-avoidance rules in Comptroller of Income Tax v AQQ25 (“AQQ”) and 
GBF v The Comptroller of Income Tax26 (“GBF”), there is good reason to 
think that the s 33A of the SDA would have sufficed to quash such 
blatant tax avoidance schemes without the need to introduce a new (and 
highly complicated) ACD framework. 
8 The aim of the new ACD framework seems to be to ensure tax 
neutrality between direct transfers of real property and indirect transfers 
through the use of PHEs. This goes beyond preventing the abuse of a tax 
loophole; it attempts to tap into an entirely new tax base that has 
hitherto not been touched by the direct stamp duties regime. 
II. Core concepts of the ACD regime 
A. The recurring theme 
9 Understanding this aim of tax neutrality is essential to 
deciphering the ACD framework. Numerous provisions in the statute 
                                                          
22 “ABSD Hike May See More Investing in Property SPVs” The Business Times 
(24 January 2013). 
23 See Claire Chua, “Residential Property of Firm Subject to Top ABSD Rate of 15%” 
(26 January 2013) <https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/ 
Forum-Replies/2013/Residential-property-of-firm-subject-to-top-ABSD-rate-of-15-/> 
(accessed 4 April 2017). 
24 Stamp Duties (Amendment) Bill (Bill 18 of 2017) Explanatory Statement. 
25 [2014] 2 SLR 847. 
26 [2016] SGITBR 1. 
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have been drafted to express a simple concept: if the effort of a 
transaction or event is that one has or will gain substantial ownership of 
a residential property, even indirectly through layers of holding entities 
or through one’s family, the transaction will be subjected to stamp duty 
as though it is a transfer of the residential property. The bulk of the 
legislative provisions relate to transforming this concept into a feasible 
system and attempting to pre-empt any potential tax avoidance schemes. 
B. Primary and subsidiary legislation 
10 Legislation for the ACD regime is extremely comprehensive, 
with care taken to close any potential loopholes in the statute. As stamp 
duty is a tax that is very focused on the form of the transaction, the 
parliamentary draftsmen chose to expressly lay out the exact mechanism 
of the ACD regime rather than provide general principles and risk 
creating loopholes. The result is a particularly voluminous statutory 
framework that is by no means easy to decipher. 
11 The ACD regime is designed for flexibility. At its core lies  
ss 23–23D and Art 3A of the First Schedule to the SDA. This primary 
legislation is supplemented by subsidiary legislation in the form of a 
“section 23 Order”27 which allows quick variation of certain crucial 
values in the ACD regime. These values relate, inter alia, to factors such 
as holding-periods and the threshold percentages of ownership that 
would render one liable for ACD. The use of subsidiary legislation 
allows the Government considerable flexibility in operating the ACD 
regime, since the values prescribed by the section 23 Order can be 
swiftly varied to achieve different tax effects without the need to seek 
prospective parliamentary approval for each change. 
C. PHEs 
12 PHEs are the focus of the ACD regime. As direct transfers of 
real property are already caught by the direct stamp duties framework, 
the ACD regime attempts to tax transfers of interests in entities which 
hold real property directly or indirectly. To understand the concept of a 
PHE, the phrase “property-holding entities” can be broken down into its 
constituent terms: (a) property, (b) holding, and (c) entity. 
13 “Property”, in this context, refers to prescribed immovable 
properties (“PIPs”),28 which correspond with the residential properties 
                                                          
27 This is provided for by s 23D of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
28 Under para 5 of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017, the zones are: 
“residential”; “commercial and residential”; “residential/institution”; “residential 
with commercial at 1st storey”; or “white”. Other specific provisions exist. 
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defined under the direct stamp duties regime. “Entities”, subject to the 
ACD regime, are companies, partnerships and property trusts.29 
“Holding” is a more complex concept. An entity is not a PHE simply 
because it holds residential property; there are requirements on how 
much it must hold. At least 50%30 of the market value of an entity must 
be made up of PIPs before an entity may be classified as a PHE31 under 
the ACD regime. This will be referred to as the “property-heavy” 
condition hereinafter. 
(1) Type 1 PHEs 
14 The property-heavy condition may be met directly, where the 
entity in question directly owns one or more PIPs. Such entities are 
classified as Type 1 PHEs under the ACD regime.32 
(2) Significant stake33 
15 An entity may hold shares in Type 1 PHEs and thus indirectly 
own PIPs. The concept of “significant stake” is crucial to the 
determination of indirect ownership of PIPs and whether the property-
heavy condition has been met. An entity (“A”) is deemed to have a 
significant stake in another entity (“B”) if it owns at least 50%34 of the 
equity in entity B or has at least 50%35 of the voting power in entity B.36 
(3) Type 2 PHEs 
16 The property-heavy condition may also be met indirectly. 
Interests in “downstream” PHEs will have to be considered in 
determining if an entity is property-heavy. The market value of the PIPs 
owned by the downstream PHE is apportioned based on the holding 
                                                          
29 See s 23(21) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). The statute provides 
for a “partnership, limited partnership or limited liability partnership”. As it is 
generally uncommon for residential properties to be held using a partnership 
structure, this article will omit discussion of partnerships. 
30 See ss 23(13)(a) and 23(13)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
Separate values are provided for Types 1 and 2 PHEs by paras 4(3) and 4(4) of the 
Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017 and the values are subject to change. Both 
values are currently 50%. 
31 These are either Type 1 or Type 2, depending on how the 50% condition is 
satisfied. 
32 See s 23(13)(a) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
33 The definition of “significant stake” for property trusts may be more complicated: 
see paras 56–58 below. 
34 This figure is provided for by para 4(1) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 
2017 and is subject to change. 
35 This figure is provided for by para 4(2) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 
2017 and is subject to change. 
36 See s 23(11) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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entity’s stake in the downstream PHE. This value must be added to the 
value of PIPs directly held by the holding PHE. The same applies to the 
total value of all assets in the holding PHE. A property-heavy entity that 
has at least one downstream PHE is classified as a Type 2 PHEs under 
the ACD regime.37 
17 When considering indirect holding of PIPs, there is no limit to 
the number of layers of entities which may separate the apex entity from 
the PIPs of the downstream entities. However, a downstream entity is 
only to be considered if its holding entity has a significant stake in it. 
Thus, an entity with 70% of its market value made up of PIPs and with a 
30% stake in a single Type 1 PHE would not be a Type 2 PHE but a 
Type 1 PHE instead. 
(4) Group entities 
18 Calculation of the market value of PIPs owned by downstream 
PHEs is relatively straightforward if the entities are neatly layered in a 
single chain, with each entity holding a significant stake in the entity 
below it in the chain. The ACD regime takes a broad “group” approach 
when considering if an entity is property-heavy.38 The significant stake 
requirement does not mandate that it is the entity directly above the 
downstream PHE that must have a significant stake. Instead, an apex 
entity may hold a significant stake in a downstream PHE through 
multiple chains of entities. 
19 For example, an entity (level 1 entity) may own a significant 
stake in three other entities (level 2 entities), each of which owns  
one-third of a Type 1 PHE. Technically, none of the three level 2 entities 
has a significant stake in the Type 1 PHE. However, if all of the level 1 
entity’s holdings are considered as a group, it would have a significant 
stake in the Type 1 PHE. Thus, the value of the PIPs in the Type 1 PHE 
will have to be considered when determining if the level 1 entity is 
property-heavy. There does not need to be an unbroken chain of Type 1 
and Type 2 PHEs from the apex entity to the PIP. 
D. Unit in a property trust 
20 A property trust is defined as a “trust that holds or invests in 
prescribed immovable properties” or units in an entity which does.39 In 
turn, a unit is defined as “a share in the beneficial ownership of the trust 
                                                          
37 See ss 23(13)(b), 23(14), 23(15) and 23(19) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed). 
38 See ss 23(18) and 23(19) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
39 See s 23(21) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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property, or a share in the profits, income or other payments or returns 
from the management of the property or operation of the business 
premised on the property”.40 For the purposes of the section, a contract 
or agreement for the sale of the abovementioned interests also 
constitutes a unit.41 Thus, one may be deemed to own a unit in a 
property trust even before the conveyance has been executed. 
E. Associates 
21 The concept of “associates”, as used in the ACD regime, is 
complex due to the numerous ways in which such a relationship can be 
drawn between parties. It is a concept of considerable importance in the 
ACD regime because the interests held by the associates of a taxpayer 
will be added to his own interests when determining: (a) if he has a 
significant stake in an entity;42 and (b) the quantum of ACD payable.43 
The primary legislation itself provides for very straightforward 
conditions: (a) spouses, parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren 
and siblings of the taxpayer are deemed to be associates;44 and 
(b) parties with whom the taxpayer has an arrangement (express or 
implied) with respect to the equity interests or voting rights in the entity 
being conveyed are also associates.45 
22 The SDA also provides that the section 23 Order may prescribe 
when an “associate” relationship may arise between parties.46 The 
definition of “associate” becomes very complicated here as there are four 
different types of “associate” relationships that may be established.47 
(1) Significant extent 
23 The concept of “significant extent” is central to the 
determination of whether an “associate” relationship exists between two 
parties under the section 23 Order. “Significant extent” is defined as: at 
                                                          
40 See s 23(21) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
41 See s 23(22) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). This also applies to 
all other entities: a contract or agreement for the sale of equity interests is deemed 
to be part of the equity interests beneficially owned by a person, even before there 
has been a conveyance of the equity interests. 
42 See s 23(12) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
43 See s 23(12) and Art 3A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed). 
44 See s 23(20)(a) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
45 See s 23(20)(c) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
46 See s 23(20)(d) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
47 See para 27 below. 
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least 75% of the voting capital of a company and at least 50% of the 
voting power of a company, or a unit in a property trust.48 
24 It is noted that this is a very similar concept to that of 
“significant stake” as discussed above. The ACD regime has three terms 
with the word “significant” in them: “significant stake”, “significant 
extent” and “significant owner”. The three terms all have their own 
distinct meanings. “Significant stake” relates to the determination of 
whether the property-heavy condition has been met. “Significant extent” 
relates to the determination of whether an entity is an “associate” of 
another entity or person. “Significant owner” relates to the 
determination of the liability to pay ACD. 
(a) The concept of indirect ownership for voting capital and voting 
power 
25 There are three ways in which an entity (“X”) may hold the 
voting capital and voting power in another entity (“Y”): (a) directly; 
(b) through a single chain; or (c) through multiple chains.49 The method 
of determining indirect ownership in this context is very similar to that 
mentioned above in the context of PHEs. In calculating whether 
entity X has indirect ownership of entity Y, one must not only consider 
its own voting capital and voting power. Instead, the voting capital and 
voting power arising from its stake in entities which it owns to a 
significant extent must also be included (apportioned by percentage 
ownership).50 
26 The aforesaid three ways of indirect ownership can be described 
as follows: 
(a) directly: 
Entity X may beneficially own the voting capital and 
voting power in entity Y directly.51 
(b) through a single chain: 
Entity X may beneficially own the voting capital and 
voting power in entity Y indirectly, through multiple 
layers of entities, with each entity owning the entity 
below it in the chain to a significant extent.52 
                                                          
48 See para 6(8) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. The definition of 
“significant extent” for property trusts may pose difficulties. See paras 59–60 
below. 
49 See para 6(2) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017; see also para 26 below. 
50 See para 6(7) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
51 See paras 6(2)(a) and 6(5)(a) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
52 See paras 6(2)(b) and 6(5)(b) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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(c) through multiple chains: 
For a multiple chain or “group” situation, the approach 
to be applied here is different from that applied in 
assessing property-heavy condition above. When 
determining indirect ownership of PIPs in the context 
of assessing the property-heavy condition, there is no 
requirement for a single chain of entities linking the 
apex entity to the PIPs. An apex entity may own a 
significant stake in a PHE through multiple chains of 
entities. 
This is not the case when determining indirect ownership in the context 
of establishing an associate relationship. The section 23 Order currently 
provides that where there is more than one chain linking the apex entity 
to the PHE, each entity in the chain must directly own the entity 
beneath it in the chain to a significant extent. There cannot be any 
“broken chains” in the structure. There is one exception to this rule. The 
entity directly above the bottommost entity (a Type 1 PHE) need not 
beneficially own the voting capital and voting power of the bottommost 
entity directly and to a significant extent.53 If this “multiple chain rule” is 
complied with, entity X may beneficially own the voting capital and 
voting power in entity Y indirectly through multiple layers of entities 
and chains.54 
(2) Types of “associate” relationships 
27 There are four different types of “associate” relationships that 
may be established under the section 23 Order:55 
(a) entity–entity–entity: 
An entity (“X”) is associated with another entity (“Y”) if 
a third entity (“Z”) beneficially owns the voting capital 
and voting power in both entities X and Y to a 
significant extent.56 
(b) entity–entity: 
An entity (“X”) is associated with another entity (“Y”) if 
entity X beneficially owns the voting capital and voting 
power in entity Y to a significant extent.57 
(c) individual–entity: 
                                                          
53 See paras 6(3) and 6(6) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
54 See paras 6(2)(b) and 6(5)(b) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
55 See para 6(1) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
56 See para 6(1)(a)(ii) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
57 See para 6(1)(a)(i) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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An individual is associated with an entity if he 
beneficially owns the voting capital and voting power in 
the entity to a significant extent.58 
(d) individual–entity–entity: 
An entity (“X”) is associated with another entity (“Y”) if 
an individual beneficially owns the voting capital and 
voting power in both entities X and Y to a significant 
extent.59 
III. Framework of the ACD regime 
A. Qualifying situations 
28 For a conveyance to be subject to ACD, it must fall within at 
least one of the four qualifying situations. The qualifying situations have 
two common requirements and then a specific requirement for each 
situation. The common requirements of all four qualifying situations are 
that: (a) there must be a conveyance of equity interests in a PHE 
(regardless of whether the conveyance was for consideration or whether 
it took place pursuant to a declaration of trust);60 and (b) the entity in 
question must be a PHE at the time of the execution.61 All four 
qualifying situations also make reference to the concept of a “significant 
owner”. 
(1) Significant owner 
29 The concept of a “significant owner” is crucial to the 
determination of whether a conveyance falls within any of the four 
qualifying situations. The ACD regime considers whether a grantor or 
grantee is a “significant owner” of the PHE to be conveyed. For 
companies, a significant owner is one who beneficially owns at least 50% 
of the equity or the voting power of a company.62 
                                                          
58 See para 6(1)(b) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
59 See para 6(1)(c) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
60 See s 23(1) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
61 See s 23(2)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), but an entity may 
be treated as if it were a property-holding entity under the conditions in ss 23(5) 
and 23(6) in the cases of duties C and D. 
62 See s 23(11) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), referring to 
paras 4(1) and 4(2) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. While the 
additional conveyance duties framework does provide definitions for “significant 
stake” for companies and partnerships, it seems to have left property trusts out: see 
para 57 below. 
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(2) The four qualifying situations 
30 The qualifying situations where ACD may be charged can be 
divided into four categories: (a) grantee has no other related interests; 
(b) grantor has no other related interests; (c) grantee has other related 
interests; and (d) grantor has other related interests. The grantee-side 
ACDs (duties A and C) mirror ABSD and BSD, while the grantor-side 
ACDs (duties B and D) mirror SSD. 
(a) Grantee has no other related interests 
31 The grantee is liable to pay duty A63 if he is a significant owner 
of the PHE either immediately before or after the execution of the 
conveyance.64 
(b) Grantor has no other related interests 
32 The grantor is liable to pay duty B if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE and the conveyance takes place within three years65 of his 
acquisition of his interest in the PHE.66 However, where a grantor 
disposes of all his interests in the PHE and then subsequently becomes a 
significant owner of the PHE again, any conveyance executed in the 
interim will not be subject to duty B.67 
(c) Grantee has other related interests 
33 The grantee is liable to pay duty C if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE either immediately before or after the execution of the 
conveyance.68 The difference from duty A is that in the determination of 
whether the target entity is a PHE, the other holdings of the grantee are 
taken into account. If the target entity would be a Type 2 PHE if it and 
                                                          
63 The calculations for the determination of all four duties are addressed in 
paras 36-44 below. 
64 See s 23(2) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
65 See s 23(8) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). This figure is provided 
for by para 3 of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017 and is subject to change. 
Note that s 23(8) provides that duty B is only payable on the parts of the interest in 
the property-holding entity that are disposed of within three years of acquisition. If 
the interest was acquired in parts and some parts were acquired more than three 
years prior to disposal, they would not be subject to duty B. Section 23(8) further 
provides that “where the grantor acquired the equity interests at different times, 
then the equity interests first acquired by the grantor are treated as being disposed 
of first by the grantor”. 
66 See s 23(3) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
67 See s 23(4) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
68 See s 23(5) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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the other entities which the grantee has a significant stake in were a 
single entity, then the target entity is deemed to be a PHE. 
(d) Grantor has other related interests 
34 The grantor is liable to pay duty D if he is a significant owner of 
the PHE and the conveyance takes place within three years69 of his 
acquisition of his interest in the PHE.70 However, where a grantor 
disposes of all his interests in the PHE and then subsequently becomes a 
significant owner of the PHE again, any conveyance executed in the 
interim will not be subject to duty D.71 The difference from duty B is 
that in the determination of whether the target entity is a PHE, the other 
holdings of the grantor are taken into account. If the target entity would 
be a Type 2 PHE if it and the other entities which the grantor has a 
significant stake in were a single entity, then the target entity is deemed 
to be a PHE. 
(3) Multiple heads of ACD on the same instrument 
35 The SDA makes it clear that both duties A and B, or both 
duties C and D, depending on the situation, may be charged on the same 
instrument and may be charged in addition to the stamp duty on 
conveyance of shares.72 This mirrors the BSD, ABSD and SSD position, 
since duties A and C are levied on the buyer and duties B and D are 
levied on the seller. 
B. Quantum of ACD 
36 In all calculations of the quantum of ACD, the interests owned 
by the grantor and grantee include those owned by their respective 
associates.73 The calculation of the quantum of ACD due requires an 
understanding of two concepts: (1) change in beneficial interest; and 
(2) related entities.74 
                                                          
69 See s 23(8) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). This figure is provided 
for by para 3 of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017 and is subject to change: 
see para 32, n 64 above. 
70 See s 23(6) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
71 See s 23(7) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
72 See s 23(9) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
73 See s 23(12) and Art 3A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed). 
74 See paras 37–40 below. 
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(1) Change in beneficial interest 
37 For duties B and D, the change in beneficial interest is simply 
the amount of equity interests that are comprised in the conveyance.75 
For duties A and C, a more complex calculation is required. The 
calculation of a change in beneficial interest requires the establishment 
of two reference values with which to calculate the change: a “before” 
value and an “after” value. Subtracting the “before” value of beneficial 
interests from the “after” value will determine the change in beneficial 
interests. 
38 The “after” value is always fixed as the value immediately after 
the conveyance. However, the “before” point is based on the status of the 
grantee.76 For a grantee who has never been a significant owner of the 
PHE since the ACD regime was enacted, the “before” value is the lowest 
amount of the beneficial interest he owns in the PHE between the 
enactment of the ACD regime and the conveyance.77 For a grantee who 
is a significant owner of the PHE both before and after the conveyance, 
the change in value is the equity interest in the PHE conveyed by the 
conveyance.78 For all other situations, the “before” value is the lowest 
value of the beneficial interest he owned in the PHE since he was last a 
significant owner of the PHE.79 
(2) Related entities 
39 The concept of related entities has two functions: (a) to 
determine if the conveyance falls within a qualifying situation; and 
(b) to determine the quantum of ACD payable. As noted above, in the 
determination of whether the target entity is a PHE, the other holdings 
of the grantor or grantee (related entities) are taken into account. If the 
target entity would be a Type 2 PHE if it and the related entities were a 
single entity, then the target entity is deemed to be a PHE. This function 
of “related entities” deals with whether there is ACD liability in the  
first place. 
                                                          
75 See Arts 3A(1)(b) and (2)(c) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act 
(Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
76 See Arts 3A(1)(a)(i)(A), 3A(1)(a)(ii)(A), 3A(1)(a)(iii), 3A(2)(a)(i)(A), 
3A(2)(a)(ii)(A), 3A(2)(a)(iii), 3A(2)(b)(i)(A), 3A(2)(b)(ii)(A) and 3A(2)(b)(iii) of 
the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
77 See Arts 3A(1)(a)(i)(B), 3A(2)(a)(i)(B) and 3A(2)(b)(i)(B) of the First Schedule to 
the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
78 See Arts 3A(1)(a)(iii), 3A(2)(a)(iii) and 3A(2)(b)(iii) of the First Schedule to the 
Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
79 See Arts 3A(1)(a)(ii)(B), 3A(2)(a)(ii)(B) and 3A(2)(b)(ii)(B) of the First Schedule 
to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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40 It is noted that while both the first and second functions apply 
to duty C, only the first function applies to duty D. Thus, calculation of 
the quantum of ACD payable under duty D is done in exactly the same 
way as for duty B (as expressed below). 
(a) Duty A: Grantee has no other related interests (mirrors BSD 
and ABSD) 
41 The BSD and ABSD rates are levied on the value of the change 
in beneficial ownership of all PIPs indirectly owned by the PHE 
(apportioned by percentage of ownership).80 
(b) Duty B: Grantor has no other related interests (mirrors SSD) 
42 The SSD rate is levied on the value of the change in beneficial 
ownership of all PIPs indirectly owned by the PHE (apportioned by 
percentage of ownership).81 
(c) Duty C: Grantee has other related interests (mirrors BSD and 
ABSD) 
43 Duty C has two components, the first of which is simply duty A. 
The second component can be determined by applying the BSD and 
ABSD rate on the value of the change in beneficial ownership of PIPs 
indirectly owned by the related entities which are also indirectly owned 
by the PHE (apportioned by percentage of ownership).82 
(d) Duty D: Grantor has other related interests (mirrors SSD) 
44 Duty D has two components, the first of which is simply duty B. 
The second component can be determined by applying the SSD rate on 
the value of the change in beneficial ownership of PIPs indirectly owned 
by the related entities which are also indirectly owned by the PHE 
(apportioned by percentage of ownership).83 
                                                          
80 See Arts 3A(1)(a) and 3A(1)(b) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act 
(Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed): the rates for buyer’s stamp duty are 1% for the first 
$180,000, 2% for the next $180,000, and 3% on the rest of the value of the property; 
and for additional buyer’s stamp duty, the rate is 15% on the value of the property. 
81 See Art 3A(1)(e) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed): for seller’s stamp duty (“SSD”), there is a 12% flat rate on the value of the 
property if the property is sold within three years of acquisition. Note that this is 
higher than the typical SSD payable for the sale of properties, which ranges from 
12% to 0%, tapering off by 4% per year since acquisition. 
82 See Arts 3A(1)(c), 3A(1)(d), 3A(2)(c) and 3A(2)(d) of the First Schedule to the 
Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
83 See Arts 3A(1)(e), 3A(1)(f), 3A(2)(e) and 3A(2)(f) of the First Schedule to the 
Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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IV. Supporting provisions 
A. Anti-avoidance 
45 Given the context in which the ACD regime arose, it is 
unsurprising that it contains extensive anti-avoidance provisions. Some 
key features are highlighted below. 
(1) Transfers of equity interests 
46 Where one of the prescribed arrangements84 has the effect of a 
person’s (“X’s”) increase in equity interests in an entity, and the 
conveyance would have been chargeable with ACD or stamp duties if it 
had been conveyed to X, the arrangement is treated as a conveyance of 
equity interests to X.85 The Commissioner is empowered to charge ACD 
and/or stamp duties on an instrument evidencing such a transfer or on a 
notice prescribed in the section 23 Order. The same applies if one of the 
prescribed arrangements has the effect of a person’s (“Y’s”) decrease in 
equity interests in an entity.86 However, if the Commissioner is of the 
opinion that that effect could not reasonably have been prevented by any 
person who is liable to pay ACD or stamp duties, he may waive 
the duty.87 
                                                          
84 The arrangements prescribed under s 23C(3) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed) are: 
(a) an acquisition by an entity of its equity interest; 
(b) an issue by an entity of equity interests; 
(c) a cancellation or redemption of equity interests in an entity; 
(d) the conversion of — 
(i) equity interests into instruments that are not equity interests; 
(ii) instruments that are not equity interests into equity interests; or 
(iii) equity interests from one class to another class; 
(e) the conversion of an entity to another type of entity; 
(f) a change of partners of a partnership, limited partnership or limited 
liability partnership; 
(g) an amalgamation of entities; and 
(h) any other arrangement that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, has as its 
purpose or one of its purposes the effect mentioned in subsection (1)(a). 
85 See s 23C(1) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
86 See s 23C(2) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
87 See s 23C(5) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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(2) Change in tangible assets of an entity 
47 Where one of the prescribed arrangements88 has the effect of an 
entity ceasing to be a PHE within one year89 of a conveyance that could 
have been chargeable with duty A or B had the entity been a PHE, the 
duties are chargeable on that instrument regardless.90 However, if the 
Commissioner is of the opinion that that the arrangement was not 
(whether solely or partly) carried out for the purpose of avoiding the 
liability to pay that duty, he may waive the duty.91 
48 This is a reverse purpose test. The burden does not lie on the 
Commissioner to show that the purpose of the arrangement was to 
avoid tax. Instead, the taxpayer must show that the purpose was not to 
avoid tax. Given the term “whether solely or partly”, it is very unlikely 
that this defence will ever succeed. Tax will almost always be a 
consideration in part for a transaction. 
(3) Equivalent arrangement 
49 The section 23 Order may prescribe certain arrangements as 
“equivalent arrangements” if their purpose or effect is to (directly or 
indirectly) alter the incidence or quantum of duty under the ACD 
regime.92 For instruments which the Commissioner thinks effect or are 
evidence of an equivalent arrangement, the ACD regime will similarly 
apply.93 The section 23 Order has not made any such prescription 
for now. 
(4) Bona fide commercial reason not a defence 
50 The SDA expressly provides that the Commissioner may still 
exercise his anti-avoidance powers on an arrangement even if it “is 
carried out for a bona fide commercial reason”.94 This is a considerable 
departure from the design of the general anti-avoidance provision95 
under the direct stamp duties regime, which provides that the section 
                                                          
88 The two prescribed arrangements under s 23C(7) of the Stamp Duties Act 
(Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) are: 
(a) a change in the composition of the tangible assets of an entity; and 
(b) any other arrangement that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, has as its 
purpose or one of its purposes such an effect … 
89 This figure is provided for by the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017 and is 
subject to change. 
90 See s 23C(6) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
91 See s 23C(8) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
92 See 23C(10) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
93 See 23C(9) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
94 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) s 23C(11). 
95 See s 33A of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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shall not apply to “any arrangement carried out for bona fide 
commercial reasons and [which] had not as one of its main purpose the 
avoidance or reduction of duty”.96 The “bona fide commercial reasons” 
test may be considered to be one of the key safeguards of general  
anti-avoidance rules and it is significant that the ACD regime has 
expressly excluded it. This is further evidence that the ACD regime is 
not a mere response to attempts to avoid the payment of stamp duties, 
but is an attempt to tap into an entirely new tax base. 
B. Liability for providing false or misleading information 
51 If the grantee of a conveyance of equity interests asks the 
grantor whether the entity is a PHE or for any information concerning 
the PHE’s underlying property and the grantor provides false or 
misleading information resulting in underpayment of ACD, the grantor 
shall be liable for up to four times the amount of duty unpaid.97 It is a 
defence for the grantor to prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
grantor had used reasonable efforts in finding the required information, 
and in verifying the truth of the information before providing it to the 
grantee.98 This corrects an information problem, which is that grantees 
may not know that there is a PHE issue and may end up underpaying 
ACD. Parliament appears to have reasonably assumed that grantees will 
ask about the status of the property. The grantee has the responsibility to 
pay the full ACD, even if not informed that the entity is a PHE, thus, the 
grantee can be expected to do his due diligence. 
52 But this not only applies to the grantor but to an associate of a 
grantor or grantee. If a grantor or grantee asks an associate of the 
grantor or grantee for information on the equity interests in the entity 
which the associate beneficially owns and the associate provides false or 
misleading information to the grantor or grantee resulting in 
underpayment of ACD, the associate shall be liable for up to four times 
the amount of duty unpaid.99 It is noted with some surprise that there is 
no similar provision for the defence of using reasonable efforts for 
associates.100 
53 This may strike some as rather harsh. There does not seem to be 
any requirement of an intention to provide false information or even 
recklessness. A negligent statement may be sufficient to land one in 
trouble. Further, the person potentially liable in this case is a mere 
                                                          
96 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) s 33A(3)(b). 
97 See s 23A(1) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
98 See s 23A(2) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
99 See s 23A(3) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
100 See s 23A(3) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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associate of the grantor, a relationship which, as noted above, can be 
very broadly construed indeed. An associate who has not received legal 
advice may well hold the view that his holdings are none of the 
questioner’s business. Relying on prosecutorial discretion or judicial 
discretion to lower the penalty may not be a sufficient safeguard for an 
offence with such a low threshold. 
C. Valuation 
54 It is noted that the Commissioner now has the power to require 
a person to obtain a valuation of property by an independent qualified 
valuer.101 This may be tricky in cases where there is no clear market 
value. This is particularly so in the context of trusts, where a valuation 
may need to be sought for interests such as life interests and remainders. 
It is unclear how this power will affect section 37 of the SDA, which 
allows a person to apply to the Commissioner to adjudicate on the value 
upon which duty is chargeable. 
V. Comments on the framework 
A. “Significant” gaps in the framework for property trusts 
55 The three “significant” concepts of (1) significant stake, 
(2) significant extent, and (3) significant owner do not seem to pose 
difficulties when the ACD framework is applied to companies or 
partnerships. However, the definitions of these three concepts set the 
threshold values in terms of percentages, which tend not to work 
particularly well when property trusts are concerned. 
(1) Significant stake 
56 The threshold value of beneficial ownership of equity interests 
for an entity to have a significant stake in another is defined in the SDA 
as “not less than the percentage prescribed in the section 23 Order as the 
significant stake percentage”;102 this is currently 50%.103 However, the 
division of the beneficial interest in a trust is considerably more flexible 
as compared with the shares of a company. The beneficial ownership of 
trust property can be divided into percentage shares, but other interests 
such as life interests, remainders and conditional gifts also exist. The 
ACD regime does not seem to have contemplated these other interests 
                                                          
101 See s 71 of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
102 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) s 23(16). 
103 See para 4(5) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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that are a lot less amenable to being expressed as a percentage of the 
trust property. 
57 If the draftsmen intended that the interests should be valued 
and then expressed as a percentage of the total value of the trust 
property, it would greatly enhance clarity if this were expressly stated. 
Otherwise, it is certainly arguable that some “units in a property trust” 
cannot constitute a significant stake since they might not be understood 
to be a percentage of ownership of the trust property. This might have 
the unintended effect of excluding indirect holdings of property held 
through property trusts when calculating if the property-heavy 
condition has been met. 
58 Since the concept of a significant stake is crucial to the 
definition of a PHE, it is arguable that ACD cannot be levied where the 
PHE is a trust. 
(2) Significant extent 
59 The section 23 Order defines “significant extent” to mean at 
least 75% of voting capital and at least 50% of voting power.104 The same 
paragraph provides that in the context of property trusts, voting capital 
refers to a unit in the property trust. This is not particularly helpful for 
determining if an entity owns another entity to a significant extent. 
First, a beneficial owner’s voting power in an entity is a concept that is 
completely foreign to trusts. In the law of trusts, the beneficiaries have 
no voting power unless they are also trustees (and even then, whilst in a 
different capacity).105 
60 Secondly, voting capital may have been defined as a unit in the 
property trust but this provides no guidance as to when a unit comprises 
of at least 75% of the units in a property trust. Again, if the draftsmen 
intended that the interests should be valued and then expressed as a 
percentage of the total value of the trust property, this should be 
expressly stated. In any case, since ownership to a “significant extent” 
requires the threshold percentages for both voting capital and voting 
power to be met, the inapplicability of the concept of voting power in 
the concept of a property trust may make it impossible for one to ever 
own a property trust to a significant extent. 
                                                          
104 See para 6(8) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
105 There may be some voting power under very limited circumstances, like in the 
exercise of a power under the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115. 
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(3) Significant owner 
61 Section 23(11) of the SDA defines a “significant owner” as: 
[A] person who beneficially owns a percentage of the equity interests 
in the entity — 
(a) that is equal to or more than the percentage 
prescribed in the section 23 Order as the equity-owning 
percentage; or 
(b) that carries voting power in the entity that is equal 
to or more than the percentage prescribed in the section 23 
Order as the voting power percentage. 
Such a definition may pose problems when it comes to its application in 
the case of property trusts. As noted above, the concept of the 
beneficiaries having voting power is largely foreign to the law of trusts 
and it is arguable that where a PHE is a property trust, s 23(11)(b) will 
not be applicable. However, it is less clear whether the alternative 
definition in s 23(11)(a) may be applicable. Again, interests in trusts are 
not always easily expressed as a percentage of the trust property and if 
the draftsmen intended that the interests should be valued and then 
expressed as a percentage of the total value of the trust property, then 
this should be expressly stated. Otherwise, since the concept of 
significant ownership is crucial to the determination of whether ACD is 
payable, it is arguable that ACD cannot be levied where the PHE is  
a trust. 
(4) Fixing all three gaps 
62 All three gaps in the ACD regime for property trusts 
highlighted above can be easily addressed by modifying the section 23 
Order as they relate to values/concepts that are to be prescribed by the 
Order. Such a modification of subsidiary legislation would not require 
any action on the part of Parliament. As such, one can expect the 
situation to be remedied very soon. 
B. Unclear terms 
(1) About the same time 
63 Section 23(12)(b) of the SDA provides: 
[I]n determining whether a grantee becomes a significant owner of an 
entity upon the execution of a conveyance, equity interests beneficially 
owned by each of the grantee’s associates in the entity, including those 
conveyed, transferred, assigned or agreed to be sold to any of the 
grantee’s associates at or about the same time as the time of execution 
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of the conveyance, are treated as beneficially owned by the grantee. 
[emphasis added] 
The issue is that “at or about the same time” is not defined anywhere in 
the SDA or the section 23 Order, giving rise to an ambiguity as to what it 
actually means. It is very important for this point to be clear since 
different interpretations could affect whether a grantee becomes a 
significant owner or not, and consequently, whether or not he will have 
to pay duty A or C. 
C. Scope of the ACD regime 
(1) Unit 
64 Section 23(21) of the SDA defines a “unit” in a property trust as: 
(a) a share in the beneficial ownership in the property subject to 
the trust; or 
(b) a share in the profits, income or other payments or returns 
from the management of the property or operation of the business 
premised on the property. 
The definition is exceedingly broad, covering not only the beneficial 
ownership of trust property but also shares of the trust income. The 
absence of an express de minimis provision is worrying given the scope 
of the definition. It is unclear what kind of beneficial interest in the 
property will suffice to be considered as a “unit”. Further, in determining 
if parties have an “associate” relationship, “significant extent” is defined 
in the context of a property trust to be “a unit”.106 Thus, there is a very 
significant risk of the broad definition of “unit” resulting in unexpected 
“associate” relationships springing up between numerous parties. As 
noted above, an “associate” relationship has serious ramifications, 
affecting both the liability to ACD and the quantum payable. 
65 “Equity interest” is defined in the SDA as “where the entity is a 
property trust, a unit in the trust”.107 This issue is that “trust” is a very 
broad concept that includes express trusts, resulting trusts and 
constructive trusts. The latter two trusts are not expressly excluded from 
the definition of “trust” in the SDA and this may give rise to unexpected 
complications. This may particularly be an issue in the case of 
constructive trusts, where it is conceivable that a share from “operation 
of the business premised on the property” may be held on constructive 
trust for another. This would depend on whether the definition of 
                                                          
106 See para 8 of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
107 See s 23(21) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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“share” requires that there must be some pre-fixed manner of 
determining the quantum of the beneficiary’s interest or whether it 
simply means that the beneficiary receives some of the proceeds from 
the trust. One can only expect complications to mount if Singapore 
jurisprudence proceeds down the path of recognising the remedial 
constructive trust. 
66 There is some limitation on the concept of “unit in a property 
trust” in that the SDA provides that a property trust is defined as a “trust 
that holds or invests in prescribed immovable properties” or units in an 
entity which does.108 However, the latter part of this definition is 
potentially problematic, that is, “or units in an entity which does”. With a 
broad definition of “units”, the concept of a property trust may 
unintentionally cover numerous unexpected situations. Again, this may 
give rise to unexpected “associate” relationships springing up between 
parties that may have significant ramifications. 
(2) Prescribed immovable property 
67 The scope of the definition of PIP is quite broad, encompassing 
zones under the Master Plan, which are: “residential”; “commercial and 
residential”; “residential/institution”; “residential with commercial at 
1st storey”; or “white”.109 However, the Bill has not expanded the classes 
of properties subject to residential property stamp duties. The definition 
under the ACD regime matches the definition of “residential property” 
under the current ABSD regime.110 
D. Other comments 
(1) Company 
68 It is noted that the ACD regime defines “entity”, inter alia, as a 
company rather than a corporation.111 Generally, under s 4 of the 
Companies Act,112 “company” excludes foreign companies. However, the 
SDA defines “company” as “any company incorporated or registered 
under any law in force in Singapore or elsewhere”.113 Thus, it is unlikely 
                                                          
108 See s 23(21) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
109 Other specific provisions exist: see para 5 of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) 
Order 2017. 
110 See Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, IRAS e-Tax Guide – Stamp Duty: 
Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) on Purchase of Residential Properties: 
Revised Edition (11 January 2013) at p 6. 
111 See s 23(21) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
112 Cap 50, 2014 Rev Ed. 
113 Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed) s 2. 
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that taxpayers will be able to escape the ACD regime by using a foreign 
company as a PHE rather than a Singapore-incorporated company. 
(2) Tax on instruments 
69 In section I of this article, it was noted that stamp duty is a tax 
levied on instruments and not transactions.114 The ACD regime may 
have somewhat weakened this concept. The SDA provides that the 
section 23 Order may require a person to give a notice relating to a 
prescribed arrangement in a specified form to the Commissioner.115 The 
Commissioner may then treat the notice as an instrument and levy 
stamp duty on it.116 Technically, this preserves the nature of stamp duty 
as a tax on instruments, though it might be said to be quite a 
technicality since it involves requiring a taxpayer to create an 
instrument solely for the purpose of levying stamp duty on it. 
E. Tax neutrality? 
70 While the aim of the ACD regime may be to ensure tax 
neutrality between direct transfers of real property and indirect transfers 
through the use of PHEs, it is not clear that this goal has been achieved 
in the post-amendment stamp duties regime. 
(1) Overlap of regimes 
71 Given that the ostensible purpose of the ACD regime is to 
ensure tax neutrality between direct and indirect transfers of residential 
property, one might expect both regimes to be mutually exclusive. 
However, the two regimes overlap in some situations, rendering the 
taxpayer liable to tax under both regimes. 
(a) Companies 
72 In the case of an indirect transfer of property through the sale of 
shares in a property-holding company, the parties to the transaction 
may not only be liable to pay duties under the ACD regime but may also 
have to pay an additional 0.2% on the consideration for the share 
transaction under the direct stamp duties regime. 
                                                          
114 See para 3 above. 
115 See s 23C(2)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
116 See s 23C(12) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), referencing para 7 
of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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(b) Partnerships 
73 Section 32A of the SDA is a specific anti-avoidance provision 
that seeks to catch instances of partners avoiding the payment of stamp 
duty by transferring their interests in the limited liability partnership 
(“LLP”) instead of the immovable property itself. This provision treats 
an instrument effecting or evidencing a significant change in partners as 
a conveyance of immovable property, on which stamp duties are 
payable. There are detailed rules in s 32(2) detailing what constitutes a 
significant change in partners. A change in the composition of partners 
or an increase in the asset shares of partners may be considered to be a 
significant change. It is noted that s 32A is limited to LLPs and does not 
include general partnerships or limited partnerships. 
74 A plain reading of the SDA suggests that there is nothing that 
would preclude s 32A and the ACD regime from simultaneously 
applying to a single transaction. If faced with the possibility of having to 
pay both duties on a single transaction, the taxpayer may wish to check 
with the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore on whether they would 
be able to avail themselves of stamp duty remission for one of  
the duties.117 
(c) Trusts 
75 Under the ABSD framework, the property count system 
determines the quantum of ABSD payable. Higher rates of ABSD are 
levied the more properties a taxpayer beneficially owns. With the ACD 
regime in force, a person who purchases 50% of the beneficial interest of 
a property-holding trust will be simultaneously penalised by both the 
ABSD regime (with one additional property count) and the ACD regime 
(with the payment of duty A or C). This is in contrast to the purchase of 
50% of the shares in a property-holding company, where 0.2% stamp 
duty will be charged on the transfer of shares and duty A or C, but no 
additions to the property count. 
76 Trusts are commonly legitimately used for succession-planning 
where the intention may not be tax avoidance at all, but to control a 
“spendthrift heir”.118 This distortion between trusts and companies may 
discourage people from using trust structures for legitimate reasons, 
which may be an unexpected and unfortunate side effect. 
                                                          
117 This may be possible under s 74 of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
118 This explains the use of the term “spendthrift trust” in America. 
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(d) Conclusion on overlap of regimes 
77 It would thus appear that regardless of which of the three kinds 
of entities subject to the ACD regime (companies, partnerships and 
trusts) that a taxpayer uses, there may be a potential overlap between the 
ACD regime and the direct stamp duties regime. Further, the tax 
consequences of the overlaps for each of the three kinds of entities are 
completely different. This may lead to distortions in taxpayer behaviour 
and encourage tax planning. Crucially, it is submitted that having any 
overlap at all is at odds with the purpose of the ACD regime in the first 
place, which is ostensibly to achieve tax neutrality between direct and 
indirect transfers of residential property. As things stand, the ACD 
regime cannot even achieve tax neutrality internally. 
(2) SSD under the ACD regime 
78 Under the direct stamp duties regime, SSD is charged at a 
tapering rate, with the SSD rate starting at 12% and tapering off year-by-
year until it reaches 0% after four years.119 The rationale for such a duty 
is clear, which is to prevent excessive speculation by penalising the quick 
resale of properties (flipping). Duties B and D are analogous to SSD. 
However, the rate for duties B and D remains at a fixed 12% if a 
conveyance takes place within three years of acquisition.120 This is an 
inconsistent result if the intention of the ACD regime is to ensure tax 
neutrality. 
(3) Anti-avoidance 
79 The anti-avoidance provisions in the ACD regime have been 
discussed above. Notably, they provide a special, very strong set of  
anti-avoidance powers to the Commissioner that are limited to the 
specific context of conveyances of equity interests in PHEs (or 
“equivalent arrangements”). This is in contrast to the direct stamp duties 
regime, where the relatively more generous s 33A of the SDA applies. 
80 As noted above, the ACD anti-avoidance provisions provide for 
a reverse purpose test, requiring the taxpayer to show that the purpose 
of a prescribed arrangement was not to avoid tax.121 The section 23 
Order may further provide that certain arrangements are “equivalent 
arrangements” that are subject to ACD. Finally, ACD may still be levied 
on an arrangement even if it “is carried out for a bona fide commercial 
                                                          
119 See Art 3(bg)(b) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 
Rev Ed). 
120 See Arts 3A(1)(e), 3A(1)(f), 3A(2)(e), and 3A(2)(f) of the First Schedule to the 
Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
121 See s 23C(7) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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reason”.122 These provisions disadvantage the taxpayer significantly and 
can have considerable bearing on the tax consequences of an 
arrangement. As the system currently stands, their applicability is solely 
determined by whether the taxpayer chooses to transfer property 
directly or indirectly. This is a massive obstacle to tax neutrality. 
(4) Industrial property 
81 The focus of the ACD regime is clearly on residential property. 
However, since it does not cover industrial property, there remains an 
incentive for taxpayers to prefer indirect transfers of industrial property 
to direct transfers. While ABSD does not apply to transfers of industrial 
property, BSD and SSD do apply. The duties payable can still be very 
significant. As noted above, the maximum rate of BSD is 3% and this 
applies to industrial property as well. Further, SSD is levied on the 
transfer of industrial property at a tapering rate, starting at a maximum 
of 15%.123 
(5) Conclusion 
82 It would seem that the ACD regime does not always provide for 
tax neutrality. A few provisions suggest that the ACD regime is actually 
considerably harsher to indirect transfers of property than the direct 
stamp duties regime is to direct transfers of property. 
VI. Values in the section 23 Order 
83 The section 23 Order allows the Government to quickly vary 
certain crucial values in the ACD regime. Significantly, s 23D(3)(e) of 
the SDA provides a wide general power for the section 23 Order to 
prescribe “any other matter required or permitted to be prescribed by 
section 23 or 23C, or that are necessary or expedient for the purposes of 
giving effect to section 23, 23A, 23B or 23C”. Depending on how 
broadly “necessary or expedient” is interpreted, the section 23 Order 
may be able to change the ACD regime in significant and unexpected 
ways. This section highlights some key values which are currently 
provided for by the section 23 Order and assesses the potential 
implications if they are changed. 
                                                          
122 See s 23C(11) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
123 The rate of 15% applies if an industrial property is sold within one year, 10% if sold 
between one and two years, 5% if sold within two to three years, and 0% if sold 
after three years: see Art 3(bd) of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act 
(Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
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A. Associate relationships 
84 Currently, the section 23 Order provides for four ways by which 
an “associate” relationship may be established between parties.124 
However, the section 23 Order may prescribe other ways as well,125 
which may make it easier to establish this “associate” relationship. This 
would have considerable implications, since the interests held by the 
associates of a taxpayer will be added to his own interests when 
determining: (a) if he has a significant stake in an entity;126 and (b) the 
quantum of ACD payable.127 Further, associates are exposed to potential 
liability arising from providing false information on PHEs. 
B. Significant extent (relevant in determining “associate” 
relationships) 
85 Currently, the section 23 Order defines “significant extent” to 
mean at least 75% of voting capital and at least 50% of voting power.128 
Both values must be met before an “associate” relationship can be 
established under the section 23 Order. As noted above, there is a 
“multiple chain rule” which provides that where there is more than one 
chain linking the apex entity to the PHE, each entity in the chain must 
directly beneficially own voting capital and voting power to a significant 
extent of each entity beneath it in the structure. As the voting capital 
value is above 50%, this means that there effectively cannot be a 
“multiple chain” structure under the current regime. At most, there can 
only be single chain structures. 
86 This will change if the value for voting capital falls to “at least 
50%” or below. In that situation, there may be more than one chain in 
the structure, greatly complicating the determination of whether entities 
are “associated” with one another. The lower the values for voting capital 
and voting power as prescribed in the section 23 Order, the more chains 
there can potentially be in a group structure. 
C. The property-heavy condition (relevant in determining if an 
entity is a PHE) 
87 As referred to above, the property-heavy condition determines 
whether an entity can be classified as a PHE. For the sake of simplicity, 
                                                          
124 See para 6 of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
125 See s 23(20)(d) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
126 See s 23(12) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed). 
127 See s 23(12) and Art 3A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 
2006 Rev Ed). 
128 See para 6(8) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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this concept was expressed as having a single value: 50% under the 
current ACD regime. The SDA makes a distinction between the 
property-heavy condition for Types 1 and 2 PHEs, with separate values 
to be applied depending on the type of PHE concerned.129 Currently, 
both values are 50%, but the section 23 Order could change one or both 
of these values. 
88 If the property-heavy condition is reduced to below 50%, more 
entities will qualify as PHEs, resulting in the ACD regime applying to 
more situations. A possible trigger for lowering the property-heavy 
condition might be avoidance attempts by taxpayers. It might be 
possible that taxpayers would shift other non-PIP assets into entities to 
dilute the percentage value of the PIPs in the property. In that case, the 
Government may well reduce the property-heavy condition value to 
reflect this. 
D. Significant stake (relevant in determining the property-heavy 
condition) 
89 The current significant stake value is 50%,130 requiring an entity 
to own at least 50% of the equity interests in a downstream entity for the 
latter entity’s assets to be taken into consideration when determining if 
the property-heavy condition has been met. Naturally, if the significant 
stake value is reduced, more downstream entities will have to be 
considered, potentially resulting in a greater number of PHEs overall. 
The current 50% value means that at most two entities can have a 
significant stake in a single downstream entity. This may no longer be 
the case if the value is reduced. 
E. Significant owner (relevant in determining ACD liability) 
90 The concept of significant owner determines whether a 
conveyance falls within the scope of one or more qualifying situations. 
The current regime provides that to be a significant owner, one must 
either have at least 50% of the equity owning percentage or at least 50% 
of the voting power percentage.131 
                                                          
129 See ss 23(13)(a) and 23(13)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), 
referencing paras 4(3) and 4(4) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017 
respectively. 
130 See s 23(16) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), referencing para 4(5) 
of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
131 See s 23(11)(a) and 23(11)(b) of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap 312, 2006 Rev Ed), 
referencing paras 4(1) and 4(2) of the Stamp Duties (Section 23) Order 2017. 
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91 These values have a direct impact on the total amount of ACD 
revenue collected. If they are reduced, more conveyances will fall within 
the scope of qualifying situations, potentially increasing ACD revenue 
collection. At the current 50% values, there can be at most four 
significant owners of a PHE: two with 50% of equity ownership and 
another two with 50% of voting power. This works out to a maximum of 
eight persons potentially being liable for ACD for a single conveyance: 
four grantors and four grantees. If the significant owner percentages are 
reduced, the maximum number of parties being potentially liable for 
ACD will increase rapidly. 
VII. Conclusion 
92 The ACD regime builds on the direct stamp duties framework 
while introducing several new concepts and tapping into an entirely new 
tax base. It has been carefully drafted to ensure tax neutrality between 
direct transfers of property and indirect transfers through the use of 
PHEs, though the net result may be that indirect transfers are treated 
less generously. The strong anti-avoidance provisions in the new regime 
make it exceedingly difficult for tax planning, which may boost the 
effectiveness of stamp duties as a tool for socio-economic policy. 
However, this may have come at the cost of additional complexity and 
uncertainty, since the ACD regime is not the easiest to understand and 
can be changed very quickly with an alteration to the section 23 Order. 
93 One of the main concerns will be attempting to understand how 
the ACD regime interacts with the current stamp duties framework. 
While the ACD regime may be attempting to tax a different tax base 
from the current stamp duties framework, the two systems overlap 
significantly. As noted above, an example would be the transfer of a 
beneficial interest in a property-holding trust. A purchaser of such an 
interest would be simultaneously penalised by both the ABSD regime 
(with one additional property count) and the ACD regime (with the 
payment of duty A or C). There may be other similar traps in the SDA, 
which may take some time to discover. 
 
